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I. INTRODUCTION

“It is not my fault; it is my brain implant which made me do it.” Some
scholars have argued that this could become a common strategy:
defendants might argue that as the result of a defective brain implant, an
autonomous brain implant, or someone hacking into their implant, they
should not be held responsible, or at least not fully responsible.
In the past few years, a neuroscientific revolution has been
underway. Neuroscience has rapidly increased our knowledge of the
functioning of the human brain, providing us with an insight into the
mental processes underpinning human behavior. This explosion of
interest in neuroscience has resulted in the development of many
neurofields: from neuroaesthetics to neuroeconomics and
neuromarketing. But as we learn more about the brain, we also learn more
about human thought and motivations. These new understandings and
knowledge about the functioning of the human brain are of great relevance
to ethics and law, given that these are disciplines primarily concerned with
the normative dimension of human behavior. That is why ethicists and
legal scholars have been interested in the impact of neuroscientific
advances, resulting in the rapid development of neuroethics2 and
neurolaw. 3
Neuroethics deals with the ethical issues in the design and conduct
of neuroscientific studies and includes topics already known in bioethics,
such as informed consent, privacy, and risk assessment, but there are other

2. See generally NEIL LEVY, NEURO ETHICS (2007); Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The
Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of Neuroscience, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 571 (2012);
NEUROETHICS (Martha J. Farah ed., 2010); Judy Illes & Stephanie J Bird, Neuroethics: A Modern
Context for Ethics in Neuroscience, 29 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 511 (2006).
3. See generally Nicole A. Vincent, Neurolaw and Direct Brain Interventions, 8 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 43 (2012); Gerben Meynen, Neurolaw: Neuroscience, Ethics, and Law. Review Essay, 17
ETHICAL THEORY MORAL PRAC. 819 (2014); F. X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience 2.0, 48 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1043 (2016).
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topics that are more specific to the field of neuroscience. 4 In this regard,
neuroethics is truly novel as it attempts to investigate the impact that our
growing understanding of brain function, and novel technologies to
manipulate brain function, may have on our ethical, social, and
philosophical conceptions. Neuroethics includes issues like personal
identity, freedom and responsibility, consciousness, and the mind body
problem. 5 Neurolaw attempts to explore the influence that neuroscience’s
discoveries may have on legal rules and court decisions, in particular the
use of evidence resulting from neurotechnologies. 6
As neurotechnology advances and opens novel opportunities for
monitoring and controlling brain function, there is uncertainty on how the
law should cope with such advancements. It remains debatable whether
emerging trends in neurotechnology call for a revision, or even a
replacement, of existing legal concepts at various levels, including civil
and criminal law, and legal philosophy.
This article explores a particular type of neuro-intervention, namely
brain implants, with a focus on deep brain stimulation (DBS), and the
possible challenges these might bring to current legal and ethical
frameworks of responsibility. Clinically available brain implants have
advanced functionalities, with some able to adjust stimulating parameters
while others are constantly monitoring brain signals and adapting their
stimulation parameters based on that data. 7 Some brain implants, such as
those for DBS, 8 are well-accepted treatments for movement disorders, 9
and their use as treatment options for various psychiatric disorders is
being explored. 10
In this article, we delve into these challenging questions, providing
an in-depth overview of the different issues that are raised. In Part II, we

4. Adina Roskies, Neuroethics for the New Millenium, 35 NEURON 21 (2002).
5. See generally sources cited supra note 1.
6. See sources cited supra note 2.
7. Meng-Chen Lo and Alik S. Widge, Closed-Loop Neuromodulation Systems: Next
generation Treatment for Psychiatric Illnesses, 29 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 191 (2017).
8. In what follows, we will be using the terms brain implants and DBS interchangeably,
though is important to be aware that DBS is a type of brain implant.
9. Paul S. Larson, Deep Brain Stimulation for Movement Disorders, 11 NEUROTHERAPEUTICS
465 (2014); Jeff M. Bronstein, Michele Tagliati, Ron L. Alterman, Andres M. Lozano, Jens
Volkmann, Alessandro Stefani, Fay B. Horak, Michael S. Henderson, Marwan I. Hariz, Roy A.
Bakay, Ali Rezai, William J. Marks, Jr., Elena Moro, Jerrold L. Vitek, Frances M. Weaver, Robert E.
Gross & Mahlon R. DeLong, Deep Brain Stimulation for Parkinson Disease, 68 ARCHIVES
NEUROLOGY 165 (2011).
10. See Ilse Graat, Martijn Figee & Damiaan Denys, The Application of Deep Brain
Stimulation in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 178 (2017); Helen
Shen, Tuning the Brain, 507 NATURE 290 (2014).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

4

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:1

will introduce a number of scenarios with added variations involving a
brain implant and undesired behavior resulting in another person being
harmed. Part IV discusses the general frames of moral responsibility and
Part V touches on the legal considerations.
II. DBS CHALLENGES RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORKS
A.

DBS Changes

DBS involves the surgical implantation of at least one electrode in
the brain, and the implantation of a pulse generator (sometimes called a
“brain pacemaker”) under the patient’s clavicle or in the abdomen, which
controls the settings of the brain implant (e.g. voltage and frequency). 11
The pulse generator is carefully programmed for each patient to deliver
electrical impulses to specific targets in the brain. DBS is considered more
precise than earlier forms of psychosurgery, due to neuroimaging and
other tools used to help guide the implantation of the electrodes within a
millimeter of their target. Unlike lesioning methods, where a part of the
brain is destroyed or removed, DBS is a neuromodulation approach, in
which electrical pulses modulate brain activity in targeted areas. It is
because of this feature that DBS is considered both adjustable and
reversible, 12 as the electrical stimulation can easily be adjusted or turned
off or on. However, given that the procedure still requires the implantation
of electrodes deep in the brain, the possibility of unintended lesioning that
is not reversible should not be fully discarded. 13
While DBS aims to treat the underlying pathophysiology of
neurological and psychiatric disorders, there are scenarios where brain
implants may influence personality and affect an individual’s behavior in
undesired ways. 14 There are already real scenarios where brain implants
have influenced an individual’s perception of the world and behavior in

11. Joel Perlmutter & Jonathan Mink, Deep Brain Stimulation, 29 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE
229, 230–31 (2006).
12. Sabine Müller, Rita Riedmuller & Ansel van Oosterhout, Rivaling Paradigms in
Psychiatric Neurosurgery: Adjustability Versus Quick Fix Versus Minimal-Invasiveness, 9
FRONTIERS INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1, 2 (2015).
13. See Jennifer Mundale, Reversibility and Deep Brain Stimulation, 3 J. COGNITION &
NEUROETHICS 97 (2016). For further discussion on the reversibility of DBS see Jonathan Pugh, No
Going Back? Reversibility and Why It Matters for Deep Brain Stimulation, 45 J. MED. ETHICS 225
(2019).
14. Robyn Bluhm, Laura Y. Cabrera & Rachel McKenzie, What We (Should) Talk About When
We Talk About Deep Brain Stimulation and Personal Identity, 13 NEUROETHICS 289 (2020).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/1

4

Cabrera and Carter-Johnson: Emergent Neurotechnologies

2020]

EMERGENT NEUROTECHNOLOGIES

5

unexpected ways. 15 There is, for example, the scenario of Mr. B, a man
who received DBS as a treatment for his severe obsessive-compulsive
disorder. Mr. B had never been a music lover until, under DBS, he
“developed a distinct and entirely novel music preference for Johnny
Cash . . . .” 16 When the device was turned off, Mr. B no longer liked
Johnny Cash. 17 Another scenario involved an epilepsy patient who
received DBS as part of an investigation to locate the origin of his
seizures, and who experienced hallucinations during the stimulation. 18
While these two scenarios did not result in harm to the patient or
others, we can think of scenarios when actions of people with brain
implants might result in harm to the patient or others. This raises a number
of ethical and legal questions. For example, if brain-implant-induced
changes in personality result in undesirable or deviant behaviors that
cause harm, who (or what) is responsible? Is the person with the implant
responsible? Can the implant be held responsible? Or can the engineer
that developed, or the company that manufactured, the implant be held
responsible? Ethical and legal questions related to responsibility are likely
to become more salient as implants increasingly include capabilities for
wireless communication and remote monitoring systems, which introduce
potential cybersecurity concerns involving malicious interference with
battery life or essential programming functions. What happens if someone
illicitly accesses and manipulates someone else’s brain implant
(“malicious brain hacking”)? 19 Who is responsible for the actions of the
person whose implant is been hacked?
15. Nsikan Akpan, Deep Brain Stimulation Triggers Hallucinations, SCIENCE (Apr. 16, 2014,
1:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/04/scienceshot-deep-brain-stimulation-triggershallucinations [https://perma.cc/9376-XQDN]. See A.F. Leentjens, V. Visser-Vandewalle, Y. Temel
& F.R. Verhey, Manipulation of Mental Competence: An Ethical Problem in Case of Electrical
Stimulation of the Subthalamic Nucleus for Severe Parkinson’s Disease, 148 NEDERLANDS
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR GENEESKUNDE, 1394 (2004); Frederik Gilbert, Deep Brain Stimulation For
Treatment-Resistant Depression: Postoperative Feeling of Self-Estrangement, Suicide Attempt, and
Impulsive-Aggressive Behaviors, 6 NEUROETHICS, 473 (2013).
16. Mariska Mantione & Damiaan Denys, A Case of Musical Preference for Johnny Cash
Following Deep Brain Stimulation of the Nucleus Accumbens, 8 FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE
1 (2014).
17. Nicky Woolf, Man Develops Powerful Love of Johnny Cash Following Deep Brain
Stimulation, GUARDIAN, May 27, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2014/may/27/johnnycash-deep-brain-stimulation-urge-listen [https://perma.cc/6DEJ-V54F].
18. Akpan, supra note 15.
19. Marcello Ienca & Pim Haselager, Hacking the Brain: Brain-Computer Interfacing
Technology and the Ethics of Neurosecurity, 18 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 117, 117 (2016). Ienca and
Haselager use the term “brain hacking” to refer to activities that directly influence neural computation
in the users of neurodevices in a manner that resembles how computers are hacked in computer crime.
See also Laurie Pycroft, Sandra G. Boccard, Sarah L.F. Owen, John F. Stein, James J. Fitzgerald,
Alexander L. Green & Tipu Z. Aziz, Brainjacking: Implant Security Issues in Invasive
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DBS Situational Possibilities
1. Unexpected personality change, Scenario 1

A 62-year-old Dutch man, Mr. D, begins experiencing manic
episodes approximately three years after being implanted with an openloop DBS system for treatment of Parkinson’s disease. Therapy with
psychiatric medication fails to control the symptoms, which include
megalomania and impulsivity. His psychological condition eventually
degrades to the point where he is no longer competent to care for himself,
and he is admitted to a psychiatric hospital. Adjustment of his DBS system
causes the manic symptoms to abate, but in the absence of DBS Mr. D’s
Parkinsonism is so severe that he becomes bedridden. Ultimately, Mr. D
has to choose between a nursing home, where he would be bedridden but
coherent, and a psychiatric ward, where he would be mobile, but manic.
He chooses the latter. 20
In this scenario, there is harm to the patient due to side effects of the
DBS treatment, but no harm to anyone else. Under what circumstances
should the DBS manufacturer be liable for the harm caused to Mr. D? The
cost of psychiatric treatment is not minimal and may not be covered by
insurance in the same way as the Parkinson’s disease symptoms.
2. Unexpected personality change, Scenario 2
Returning to Mr. B, we might imagine a scenario where he has
further issues arising, albeit indirectly, from his DBS treatment. Mr. B
loves Johnny Cash, except when he doesn’t. Mr. B received DBS as a
treatment for his severe obsessive-compulsive disorder. He had never
been a music lover until, under DBS, he developed a liking for Johnny
Cash. When the device is turned off, the preference disappears. 21 Let us
think about the potential consequences: while using the device, Mr. B
spends thousands of dollars collecting Johnny Cash’s music and
memorabilia—ending up hopelessly in debt. When Mr. B loses his job
and home, foreclosure threatens due to his lack of savings, and he decides
to rob a bank rather than sell his Johnny Cash collection.

Neuromodulation, 92 WORLD NEUROSURGERY 454 (2016); Mark N Gasson & Bert-Jaap Koops,
Attacking Human Implants: A New Generation of Cybercrime, 5 L., INNOVATION & TECH. 248
(2013).
20. Felicitas Kraemer, Authenticity or Autonomy? When Deep Brain Stimulation Causes a
Dilemma, 39 J. MED. ETHICS 757, 757–58 (2013) (adapted from Leentjens et al., supra note 15).
21. Woolf, supra note 17.
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Who is liable for the harm due to the bank robbery? The DBS
treatment did not directly force Mr. B to rob the bank, but it set up the
love for Johnny Cash that led to depleting savings accounts and thus the
robbery. Would Mr. B have robbed the bank absent the DBS treatment?
Did DBS change his state of mind or just his circumstances? What if,
without DBS, Mr. B’s savings would not have been enough to save his
home due to other costs associated with his disease?
3. Malfunction Scenario
Imagine that Ms. Q is driving one day and has a sudden urge to
swerve into a bus stop where several people are standing. As a result, she
ends up damaging the bus stop and injuring several people. During the
investigation, police find that Ms. Q has a brain implant to treat her
Parkinson’s disease. This implant malfunctioned at the time the urge
occurred. Who is liable for the damage to the bus stop?
Common causes for DBS malfunction might include electroderelated failure (electrode migration, electrode fracture), unit malfunction
(battery failure or component malfunction), and malfunction related to
exposure to high voltage electricity or high-intensity microwaves. These
malfunctions can result in rebound symptoms, 22 as well as worsening of
symptoms, suicidality, mood disturbances, and panic attacks. 23
4. Closed-loop AI system
Think again of the hypothetical scenario of Ms. Q. This time assume
that during the police investigation no malfunction of the device is found.
However, it is revealed that Ms. Q had a closed-loop brain implant, as part
of her DBS treatment, rather than an open-loop implant.
Closed-loop brain implants have been in use for certain types of
treatment-refractory epilepsy (Neuro Pace RNS System). In addition,
closed-loop DBS systems just gained Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) approval to be used for patients with Parkinson’s disease, essential

22. Marwan I. Hariz & F. Johansson, Hardware Failure in Parkinsonian Patients with Chronic
Subthalamic Nucleus Stimulation is a Medical Emergency, 16 MOV. DISORD. 164 (2001); François
Alesch, Sudden Failure of Dual Channel Pulse Generators, 20 MOV. DISORD. 64 (2004); Richard G
Bittar, John Yianni, ShouYan Wang, Xuguang Liu, Dipankar Nandi, Carole Joint, Richard Scott,
Peter G. Bain, Ralph Gregory, John Stein & Tipu Z. Aziz, Deep Brain Stimulation for Generalised
Dystonia and Spasmodic Torticollis, 12 J. CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 12, 14 (2005); A.K. Vora, H. Ward,
K.D. Foote, W.K. Goodman & M.S. Okun, Rebound Symptoms Following Battery Depletion in the
NIH OCD DBS Cohort: Clinical and Reimbursement Issues, 5 BRAIN STIMULATION 599 (2012).
23. Vora et al., supra note 22.
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tremor, dystonia, epilepsy, or OCD. 24 The direct way in which these
implants are linked and interact with the human brain can make the source
of an act difficult to identify. 25
Human accountability for harms caused by the use of closed-loop
devices might occur in several ways. For example, if a form of “veto” is
built into the system, 26 then a person could be held accountable for failing
to exercise the veto. But what happens when we have fully autonomous
implants using machine learning algorithms? An interesting parallel here
is that of autonomous cars or autonomous weapon systems with evolving
algorithms controlling their actions. Here, the issue is that the implant’s
decisions are not preprogrammed, but rather are based on acquired
experience. 27 In these scenarios, the greater degree of autonomy—being
able to respond and adapt to the environment in unpredictable and
intelligent ways—opens up a potential “responsibility gap.” 28
5. Brain hacking
To complicate matters more, what happens if someone illicitly
accesses and manipulates someone else’s brain implant (“malicious brain
hacking”)? A brain implant remotely compromised by a third party to
commit an offense such as an assault would make it even more
challenging to determine causality and obtain proof in legal proceedings.
Who is responsible for the actions of the person whose implant has been
hacked? The possibility of “brain hacking” is a serious consideration. At
present, examples of ways in which brain hacking can affect user’s
behaviors and thoughts is by disrupting the functionality of the brain
implant (e.g. turning off the stimulation, changing the stimulation

24. FDA Approves First-Of-Its-Kind PerceptTM PC Neurostimulator with BrainSenseTM
Technology, MEDTRONIC NEWSROOM (June 25, 2020), https://newsroom.medtronic.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/fda-approves-first-its-kind-percepttm-pc-neurostimulator
[https://perma.cc/7CVZ-UJN8].
25. See Eliza Goddard, Deep Brain Stimulation Through the “Lens of Agency”: Clarifying
Threats to Personal Identity from Neurological Intervention, 10 NEUROETHICS 325 (2017). Goddard
discusses different ways in which the threat to identity has been framed, arguing that “the ethically
salient issue from DBS is impacts on autonomous agency—whether one’s actions and beliefs are
one’s own”. Id. at 326.
26. See Jens Clausen, Eberhard Fetz, John Donoghue, Junichi Ushiba, Ulrike Sporhase,
Jennifer Chandler, Niels Birbaumer & Surjo R. Soekadar, Help, Hope, and Hype: Ethical Dimensions
of Neuroprosthetics, 356 SCIENCE 1338, 1338 (2017).
27. Andreas Matthias, The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the Actions of
Learning Automata, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 175, 176 (2004) (quoted in Mark A Chinen, The CoEvolution of Autonomous Machines and Legal Responsibility, 20 J.L. TECH. 1 (2016)).
28. Matthias, supra note 27.
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parameters). 29 In the future, brain hacking could also involve illicit access
to brain information that can be used in a manner that resembles the threats
caused by computer hacking, such as blackmailing individuals, selling the
information to third parties, or generating undesired behaviors. 30 These
malicious modifications may threaten the person with the implant by
causing a DBS device to operate, for example, out of safe parameters.
Moreover, the forced intrusion into and alteration of a person’s neural
processes poses an unprecedented threat to that person’s mental integrity
because these activities can “limit and constrain their behavior, generate
emotional responses such as panic, fear, and psychological distress, and
leave traumatic memories.” 31 While these neurosecurity threats are still
mostly theoretical, they are increasingly likely to emerge as software and
remote monitoring become embedded in more medical devices. 32
All the above scenarios invite us to think about moral and legal
responsibility as technology advances. Is Ms. Q solely responsible for her
actions? Can we attribute any blame to the DBS device, in particular in
the scenario of closed-loop systems? What about the engineers who
designed it or the company that manufactured it? The neurosurgeon who
implanted it or the neurologist who programmed the device parameters?
Lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists have labored in a parallel
fashion to define the conditions under which individuals are to be judged
legally and morally responsible for their actions. 33 The scenario of brain
implants and questions about responsibility are of particular interest
because the brain is generally regarded as the center of control, rational
thinking, and emotion. It is the organ orchestrating people’s actions and
behaviors. As such, the brain is key to agency, autonomy, and
responsibility.

29. Ienca & Haselager, supra note 19, at 119. See also Pycroft et al., supra note 19.
30. Ienca & Haselager, supra note 19, at 120; Pycroft et al., supra note 19, at 456. Pycroft and
colleagues summarize under Table 1 of their article different forms of attack and the potential harms
they can cause to individuals.
31. See generally Marcello Ienca & Roberto Andorno, Towards New Human Rights in the Age
of Neuroscience and Neurotechnology, 13 Life Sci. Soc. Pol’y 1 (2017); Ienca & Haselager, supra
note 19, at 119.
32. Pycroft et al., supra note 19, at 454 (Neurosecurity refers to defense mechanisms protecting
brain devices); See Daniel B. Kramer & Kevin Fu, Cybersecurity Concerns and Medical Devices,
JAMA 1–2 (2017); Gasson & Koops, supra note 19; Pycroft et al., supra note 19.
33. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1 (W.D. Ross trans., Internet Classics
Archive) (c. 384 B.C.E.) Part II Section 4; T. Wardlaw Taylor, Jr., The Law and Responsibility, 7
PHIL. REV. 276 (1898); Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014); John Martin Fischer, Recent Work on Moral Responsibility, 110 ETHICS
93 (1999).
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In what follows, we will explore the ethical and legal challenges of
responsibility related to DBS and brain implants in general.
III. ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Historically, moral and legal responsibility have predominantly
focused on the autonomous individual, i.e., someone with the capacity to
deliberate or act on the basis of one’s own desires and plans, free of
distorting external forces. 34 However, with modern technological
advances, many “hands” may be involved in the operation of these brain
implants, including artificial intelligence agents directly influencing the
brain. This external influence raises questions about the degree to which
someone with an implant can control actions and behaviors. If brain
implants influence someone’s decisions and behaviors, do they undermine
the person’s autonomy? If autonomy is undermined, can we attribute
responsibility to the individual? What makes a certain agent responsible
for a certain event? Can we ever ascribe responsibility to an artificial
intelligence-based brain implant? Responsibility is a complex concept
used both in law and in moral philosophy to describe the attribute or state
of being responsible. It is generally associated with “getting the credit or
blame for acts or decisions,” being “liable to be called to account as the
primary cause, motive, agent,” or being “liable to legal review or in case
of fault to penalties.” 35 These definitions reflect various understandings
of moral and legal responsibility common in the West, as well as the ways
in which the concept is intertwined with, and overlaps with, notions like
accountability, liability, blameworthiness, and causality.
A.

Moral responsibility

There are ongoing debates on what sets a particular form of
responsibility, such as moral responsibility, apart from other kinds of
responsibility. A generally accepted view on moral responsibility says that
a person is morally responsible when her voluntary actions lead to morally
significant outcomes that would make her suitable to praise or blame. The
causal connection between the person and the outcomes of voluntary
actions is one of the main conditions to ascribe moral responsibility

34. Lewis Hinchman, Autonomy, Individuality, and Self-Determination, in WHAT IS
ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY QUESTIONS 488
(James Schmidt ed., 1996).
WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam35. Responsible,
MERRIAM
webster.com/dictionary/responsible [https://perma.cc/YL9Q-YW6Y].
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(volitional condition). 36 Another important condition is that the agent
must have knowledge of what the agent is doing in order to be able to
consider the possible consequences of a given action (epistemic
condition). Thus, if someone could not have known that his or her actions
would lead to a harmful event, we tend to mitigate responsibility (and in
some cases even excuse the person). This condition of responsibility goes
back to Aristotle, who argued that since ignorance is a form of involuntary
action, it could remove or diminish a person’s moral responsibility.37
Another important criterion is the ability to freely choose to act in a certain
way, so one cannot be held responsible for actions determined by outside
forces. 38
1. Causal contribution
In the scenarios we are exploring here, it is not clear the impact on
decision making and behavior such brain implants can have on an
individual. Holding a person responsible for what someone else has done,
or an event she has no control over, is generally seen as unfair and
unjustified. 39 Brain implants complicate the causal connections between
a person’s actions and the consequences. Can we hold the person morally
responsible for an action that was caused by the brain implant?
Technologically-mediated, undesired events are usually the result of an
accumulation of errors, biases, or failures to notice or do something of
various individuals (and in some cases even algorithms) involved in the
development, function, use, maintenance, and regulatory oversight of a
brain implant. Take the hypothetical scenario with Ms. Q. The crash with
the bus stop could have resulted from the combination of a number of
factors, including battery depletion, hardware errors, programming errors,
inadequate testing of programming settings, overconfidence in
programming settings or machine learning algorithms, and inadequate
investigation of adverse events or accident reports. In addition, there are
36. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Necessity and Desire, 45 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1, 3
(1984); Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 10 (1982).
37. ARISTOTLE, supra note 33, at Book III Section 1.
38. Id. Aristotle pointed to all of these conditions: “[I]f the acts that are in accordance with the
virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately.
The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have
knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes.” See Adina
Roskies, Neuroscientific Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 419
(2006). Contemporary views about freedom of choice have been contested in light of new
neuroscientific evidence, however as Roskies argues “they are not likely to affect practical judgments
of moral responsibility.” Id. at 422.
39. Fischer, supra note 33, at 95.
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multiple individuals whose actions (or inactions) could have shaped the
outcome, including engineers, device manufacturers, clinicians, users,
and even policymakers.
The fact that a given outcome involves multiple agents (human and
non-human), each one contributing in different ways to the outcome, gives
rise to what is known as the problem of “many hands.” 40 The more agents
(human and non-human) contribute to a given outcome, the more difficult
is to determine who or what was responsible. 41 All of this complicates
tracing the series of events that led to incidents like those presented in the
above scenarios. Was the algorithm underlying the device functioning
without errors? Were the manufactured parts of the device working within
specifications for medical devices? Did the clinician adequately implant
and program the device in the brain target? Did patients using the device
follow the indications on things to do or not to do with the device
implanted?
Another problem is the temporal and physical distance. The
engineers of an automated brain implant, for example, make choices
ahead of time determining how implants will act, but they rarely will see
how these decisions impact patients with those implants. As Coeckelbergh
argues, we are in a situation of “epistemic opacity” as “between our
actions and the consequences of our actions lies a complex world of
relationships, people, things, time and space.” 42 Moreover, technologies
are not isolated instruments; they are “socially constructed and society
shaping.” 43 In this regard, brain implants are one more example of
complex technological systems complicating the task of attributing
responsibility, both from a backward-looking and forward-looking
perspective. 44

40. See generally Ibo van de Poel, Lamber Royakkers, and Sjoerd D. Zwart, MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF MANY HANDS (2015). Van de Poel and colleagues define the
problem of many hands as “undesirable outcomes in collective setting for which it is hard or even
impossible to hold an individual or organization . . . responsible” Id. at 4. Floridi also describes the
problem of the “invisible hand” which results from the “systemic interactions among multiagent
systems (comprising several agents, not all necessary human).” Luciano Floridi, Distributed Morality
in an Information Society, 19 SCI, & ENGINEERING ETHICS 727, 728 (2012).
41. Van de Poel et al., supra note 40; Katinka Waelbers, Technological Delegation:
Responsibility for the Unintended, 15 SCI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 51, 52–53 (2009).
42. Waelbers, supra note 41, at 52; MARK COECKELBERGH, HUMAN BEING @ RISK, 103
(2013).
43. Thomas P. Hughes, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems, in THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 45 (Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes & Trevor
Pinch eds., 2012).
44. Van de Poel et al., supra note 40, at 5.
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2. Considering the consequences
Another important aspect of moral responsibility is the capacity of
an agent to consider and deliberate about the consequences of her action.
It is not well-established how much brain implants shape how people
perceive and experience the world, or whether this affects in any relevant
way the described condition for responsibility.
Brain implants are complex technologies, with users and clinicians
often having only a partial understanding of the assumptions, models, and
theories on which these implants operate. These issues become more
salient when thinking of closed-loop implants with machine learning
capabilities, where even the developers might not fully understand what
lies behind the decision-making tree, or when thinking of capabilities that
increase the likelihood of hacking a brain implant.45 As philosopher John
Ladd nicely captures it, “[t]echnology has created new modes of conduct
and new social institutions, new vices and new virtues, new ways of
helping and new ways of abusing other people”. 46
3. Freedom to act
Another important condition for the attribution of moral
responsibility is the freedom to act, which in moral philosophy is often
discussed as a person having free will or autonomy. 47 We hold individuals
morally responsible when they have the capacity to control their behavior,
on the basis of their own authentic reasons and motivations. 48 That is why
we generally do not hold people responsible if they are manipulated or
forced to take a particular action. Brain implants might affect the decisions
that someone makes, and how he or she makes them, by facilitating and
enabling particular human cognitive processes, actions, or attitudes while
constraining and inhibiting others. As Verbeek argues, “technological
artifacts are not neutral intermediaries but actively coshape people’s being

45. See Ienca & Haselager, supra note 19; Pycroft et al., supra note 19; Eduard Marin, Dave
Singelée, Bohan Yang, Vladimir Volski, Guy A.E. Vandenbosch, Bart Nuttin & Part Preneel,
Securing Wireless Neurostimulators, PROC. EIGHTH ACM CONF. ON DATA & APPLICATION
SECURITY & PRIVACY 287 (2018).
46. J. Ladd, Computers and Moral Responsibility: A Framework for an Ethical Analysis, in
THE INFORMATION WEB: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF COMPUTER NETWORKING 207,
210–11 (C. C. Gould ed., 1989).
47. Fischer, supra note 33.
48. Id. Fischer argues that control in moral responsibility is more about the possibility of an
agent “to select from among various genuinely open paths the world might take,” and not necessarily
as control in the sense of self-governance that theories of autonomy often imply. Id. at 99.
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in the world: their perception and actions, experience, and existence.” 49
For instance, in the scenario of patient Q undergoing DBS, acts conducted
as a result of hallucinations challenge this condition of moral
responsibility.
There is also a lack of consensus on the conditions that enable
individuals to act freely. For some it is rationality, for others it is
intentionality or emotion, for others it is a combination of all of these.
Recent neuroscience research has questioned whether human beings
really act out of free will. 50 While we are not going to delve into a
discussion of free will here, we do want to discuss a connected concept,
autonomy.
The concept of autonomy within bioethics and philosophy is not
without ambiguity, 51 but it is generally taken to be the capacity of
someone to deliberate or act on the basis of one’s own desires and plans
and not as the product of manipulative or distorting external forces. 52
Research has shown how easy is to manipulate, control, or influence
individuals, both by external forces (such as peer pressure) or internal
ones (such as addictions or mental problems). However, direct brain
interventions seem unique in that they surpass the conscious awareness of
individuals to even decide on whether to follow a set of actions or not.53
In this regard, brain implants add an additional layer of complexity in
determining whether an individual has acted freely or autonomously, or if
the implant had inserted enough influence to raise a question about the
freedom of individual choice and behavior.
If the device is not controlled directly by the agent, like in the
scenario of someone brain hacking the device, that seems like a classic
case of manipulation, where we have anomalous and unusual causation.

49. Peter-Paul Verbeek, Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation,
31 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 361, 364 (2006).
50. Roskies, supra note 38, at 419; See also Giuseppe Sartori, Silvia Pellegrini & Andrea
Mechelli, Forensic Neurosciences: From Basic Research to Applications, 24 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROLOGY 371, 371 (2011); Kerri Smith, Taking Aim at Free Will, NATURE 1 (2011); Patrick
Haggard, Human Volition: Towards a Neuroscience of Will, 9 NATURE REV. NEUROSCI. 934 (2008).
51. See, e.g., W. Glannon, Neuromodulation, Agency and Autonomy, 27 BRAIN TOPOGRAPHY
46 (2012); Frédéric Gilbert, A Threat to Autonomy? The Intrusion of Predictive Brain Implants, 6
AJOB NEUROSCI. 4 (2015); B. Jennings, Reconceptualizing Autonomy: A Relational Turn in
Bioethics, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT (2016).
52. See Hinchman, supra note 34; S. Buss, Personal Autonomy, THE STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL.
(2002).
53. Vincent, supra note 3; Jan C. Bublitz and Reinhard Merkel, Crimes Against Minds: On
Mental Manipulations, Harms and Human Right to Mental Self-Determination, 8 CRIM LAW PHILOS.
51 (2014). Bublitz and Merkel argue “direct interventions change the cognitive machinery itself.” Id.
at 69.
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In the scenario of brain hacking, the manipulator bypasses the agencyrelevant capacities of the agent, substantially undermining individual
autonomy. This is important because in Western jurisprudence the
capacity for voluntary control over one’s actions is considered a requisite
for individual legal liability regarding those actions. 54 Furthermore, as
implants become more common, it is plausible that we are going to
confront many more cases of anomalous causation, blurring the lines
between ordinary agency and cases of manipulation.The difficulty of
ascribing responsibility in light of the ways in which brain implants, such
as the ones discussed here, muddle the conditions for it, is an indicator of
the limitations of conventional ethical frameworks in dealing with the
question of moral responsibility. While the nature of technology is
relevant to the responsibility arrangements, such arrangements are, in the
end, “socially constituted through the norms and expectations of particular
activities and contexts.” 55 In the case of brain implants societal
attributions of responsibility are also impacted by the intentions and
actions of other human agents involved in the design, manufacture, and
programming of the device. Thus, acting with brain implants may require
a different kind of analysis as to who can be held responsible and what it
means to be morally responsible.
B.

Shared responsibility

Moral responsibility has predominantly been about human action and
its intentions and consequences. 56 Moreover, since Aristotle, moral
responsibility accounts in the Western tradition have concentrated
primarily upon the individual’s responsibility. However, as described
above, there are scenarios where several agents are involved, making it
difficult to identify one single agent as the responsible one. Shared
responsibility involves multiple actors contributing to a single outcome,
in situations where we cannot determine an individual’s causal
contributions, and where responsibility is distributed to each actor
separately, rather than collectively. 57 Shared responsibility has figured

54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter
Model Penal Code].
55. Deborah G. Johnson, Technology with No Human Responsibility?, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 707,
713 (2014); See also Hughes, supra note 43.
56. See Fischer, supra note 33.
57. André Nollkaemper & Dov Jacobs, Shared Responsibility in International Law: A
Conceptual Framework, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 364 (2013) (discussing shared responsibility in
court systems with multiple actors). See also Van de Poel et al., supra note 40 (discussing collective
responsibility).
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only minimally in the ethical and legal literature (predominantly in the
discussion about states and organizations). 58
While shared responsibility might be helpful in scenarios where
causation does not provide an adequate basis for responsibility, several
questions arise. If several persons share responsibility for what happens
as a result of what they have done, what factors affect the degree to which
each person involved is responsible for the outcome? While several
individuals might be involved in the outcome, it is not clear that each have
equal degrees of responsibility. Thinking about brain implants, can human
entities and non-human entities share responsibility? If yes, what factors
affect the degree to which each agent (human or non-human) is
responsible for the outcome? For example, in the scenario of a brain
implant with a malfunction, it might be easy to establish which agents bear
the most responsibility. But in the scenario of an autonomous brain
implant, it might not be that easy to figure out if the individual or the
implant had a bigger role in the final state of affairs.
Just as the normative foundations of individual moral responsibility
remain unsettled, so is the case for shared responsibility. Some authors
argue that shared responsibility is based on having shared goals, while for
others it is about sharing benefits. 59 Based on the latter, it could be argued
that people with brain implants also bear some responsibility since they
have employed the implant for their benefit. Moreover, we can argue that
engineers, device manufacturers, physicians, in as much as they know the
potential risks and enjoy the benefits from selling and implanting these
devices, also share moral and legal responsibility in cases of harm from
these implants.

C.

Agency

The concept of agency is “associated with the idea of being capable
of doing something that counts as an act or action,” 60 and being able to
think about those actions (that is, being able to translate desires into
intentions by combining them with beliefs). There can be different types

58. Id.
59. Chinen, supra note 27.
60. Kenneth, E. Himma, Artificial Agency, Consciousness, and the Criteria for Moral Agency:
What Properties Must an Artificial Agent Have to be a Moral Agent?, 11 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 19,
19 (2008).
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of agency (e.g., rational agency); 61 here we are concerned with moral
agency.
The concept of moral agency is “ultimately a normative notion that
is concerned with the class of beings whose behavior is subject to moral
requirements.” 62 To be a moral agent involves the capacity to be morally
accountable for one’s actions. Thus, moral agency requires the capacity
to freely choose one’s acts and the capacity to be rational. For moral
agency, this second capacity is particularly related to the capacity to
engage in moral reasoning. 63
Agency is philosophically intertwined with autonomy. Moreover,
autonomy and moral agency go hand in hand with responsibility. When
an agent acts autonomously, “it is not possible to hold anyone else
responsible for its actions.” 64 This link between agency and responsibility
is explicitly expressed by the USA Model Penal Code (MPC), Section
2.01, which states that “(1) a person is not guilty of an offense unless his
liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission
to perform an act of which he is physically capable.” 65
Two other major views of agency are the realist and the attributivist
view. According to the former, “the intention to act and the will that leads
to the performance of an act are taken to be “real” things, which exist
independently of human experience.” 66 Whereas on the attributivist view,
“intention and free will are attributed, or ascribed, to human agents.” 67
This view is supported by the fact that we experience intentions both in
our own acts as well as in the acts of others. According to Hage, because
attribution is mind-dependent, at least under this view, “agency and
responsibility may be attributed to anything,” 68 not only humans.

61. For an overview of different conceptions, theories and kinds of agency see Markus
Schlosser, Agency, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2019/entries/agency.
62. Himma, supra note 60, at 21.
63. Id. at 24. Moral reasoning requires a “minimally adequate understanding of moral
concepts,” the ability to grasp basic moral principles, and “the ability to identify the facts that make
one rule relevant and another irrelevant.” Id.
64. Chinen, supra note 27, at 361.
65. Model Penal Code, supra note 54. See also Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal
Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1436–39 (1968).
66. Jaap Hage, Theoretical Foundations for the Responsibility of Autonomous Agents, 25
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 255, 259 (2017).
67. Id. at 260.
68. Id. at 261.
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Revisiting the concept of moral responsibility

The use of brain implants, as with the introduction of other new
technologies, have made our practices for holding an actor responsible
subject to being continuously challenged and negotiated. 69 In the case of
brain implants, we can raise the question, how exactly does a brain
implant interfere with agency? Does it interfere with the mental
components or the physical ones? Is the integration of the brain implant
into our own biology such that the implant integrates with the implicit,
subconscious aspects of brain activity and so bypasses the traditional
mental capacities of agency? Is the brain implant by itself undermining
individual autonomy and agency as it detaches the intention-action causal
link, putting into question the voluntary character of the user’s actions?
Thinking of the scenario of Mr. B, we would suggest that he is not
responsible for his Johnny Cash-loving behavior. The only complication
here is that once he knows that the machine has this effect on his agency—
and he retains the ability to switch the machine on and off—one might be
inclined to argue that he acquires responsibility for those behaviors
through his continued use of the device. But this argument should be
treated with caution. If the patient needs the device to treat some disabling
mental or physical condition, then he is faced with a very stark choice.
Indeed, one could argue that patients facing such a stark choice are in a
way coerced by the benefits of the implant.
Given the challenges that are posed to our traditional frameworks for
dealing with moral responsibility, some have suggested rethinking how
and to whom (or to what) moral responsibility is assigned. 70
E.

Can brain implants be moral agents?

Moral responsibility is generally attributed to moral agents, which at
least in Western philosophical traditions are exclusively human beings (as
they have been regarded as the only beings capable of acting
“intentionally and on the basis of free will”). 71 However, with advances

69. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Accountability in a Computerized Society, 2 SCI. &
ENGINEERING ETHICS 25 (1996).
70. Waelbers, supra note 41; Peter Kroes & Peter-Paul Verbeek, Introduction in 17 THE
MORAL STATUS OF TECHNICAL ARTEFACTS 6 (Peter Kroes & Peter-Paul Verbeek eds., 2014);
Matthias, supra note 27.
71. Hage, supra note 66, at 258.
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in neuroscience, computer technology, and artificial intelligence systems,
who or what qualifies as a moral agent has been questioned. 72
Some authors argue that as systems become increasingly more
autonomous, humans will not be responsible for their behavior. Andreas
Matthias characterizes this as a responsibility gap: “[T]here is an
increasing class of machine actions, where the traditional ways of
responsibility ascription are not compatible with our sense of justice and
the moral framework of society because nobody has enough control over
the machine’s actions to be able to assume the responsibility for them.” 73
Others like Robert Sparrow argue that “it will no longer be possible [to]
hold the programmers/designers responsible for outcomes that they could
neither control nor predict. The connection between the
programmer/designers and the results of the system, which would ground
the attribution of responsibility, is broken by the autonomy of the
system.” 74
Other authors reject the responsibility gap by rejecting the “control
requirement condition”, which states that “a person is responsible for x
only if the person has control over x.” 75 However, as Santoro and
colleagues argue, the control requirement is not needed to hold people
responsible, as there are cases in which humans are held responsible for
outcomes that are outside their control, such as in strict liability cases.
Others, such as Nagenborg and colleagues argue that engineers
developing and programming brain implants, are responsible for the
behavior of the implants they create, on grounds of professional
responsibility, even if they cannot control the behavior of their creations. 76
Some scholars would call this type of responsibility “positive,”
which emphasizes “the virtue of having or being obliged to have regard
for the consequences of his or her actions on others.” 77 However, to what
extent can engineers, developers, and even physicians be expected to exert
themselves to anticipate or prevent the consequences of the (mis)use of
their technologies or the technologies they programmed? A more fruitful

72. William Bechtel, Attributing Responsibility to Computer Systems, 16 METAPHILOSOPHY
296 (1985); Lucas D. Introna, Towards a Post-Human Intra-Actional Account of Sociomaterial
Agency (and Morality), 17 PHIL. ENGINEERING & TECH. 31, 33–34.
73. Matthias, supra note 27, at 177.
74. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62, 70 (2007).
75. Matteo Santoro, Dante Marino, & Guglielmo Tamburrini, Learning Robots Interacting
with Humans: From Epistemic Risk to Responsibility, 22 AI & SOC’Y. 301, 309 (2008).
76. Michael Nagenborg, Rafeal Capurro, Jutta Weber & Christoph Pingel, Ethical Regulations
on Robotics in Europe, 22 AI & SOC’Y. 349 (2007).
77. Donal Gotterbarn, Informatics and Professional Responsibility, 7 SCI. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 221, 227 (2001).
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way to look at this is to approach responsibility as having a social
function, as what counts is the “social consequences it produces,”78
including the expectations among it creates among members of society
and the incentives it promotes to correct or encourage certain behavior.
Others have responded to the responsibility gap by entertaining the
possibility that artificial agents could themselves be held responsible.
Certainly, not all brain implants would qualify as moral agents. According
to Daniel Dennett, for a system to be a moral agent, is not enough to be
an intentional system, but the system itself must be a “higher-order
intentional system.” 79 That is a system whose behavior relates to its
mental states, “capable of framing beliefs about its own beliefs, desires
about its desires . . . and so on.” 80 Thus, while our examples above might
not be instances of moral agents, the development of brain implants with
higher-order intentionality remains a real possibility.
In the future, if artificial intelligence-embedded closed loop brain
systems get to a point where they can be considered “higher-order
intentional systems,” it might be reasonable to hold these systems
responsible, and not only their makers, or users. 81 The “advanced learning
capability will not only make it harder to blame developers and users . . .
but will also make it more reasonable to assign responsibility to the
[implants],” 82 as humans will be more inclined to treat these agents as if
these were responsible for their own behavior. 83 Others, like Asaro, think
that like corporations, intelligent agents themselves can bear
responsibility. 84 In this case, these entities acquire the status of moral
agents. 85
There have been several authors who oppose the view that
computational systems can be regarded as moral agents. Some argue that
for a moral agent to be held responsible it has to “be capable of

78. Bernd Carsten Stahl, Responsible Computers? A Case for Ascribing Quasi-Responsibility
to Computers Independent of Personhood or Agency, 8 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 205, 210 (2006).
79. Daniel C. Dennett, When HAL Kills, Who’s to Blame? Computer Ethics in HAL’S LEGACY:
2001’S COMPUTER AS DREAM AND REALITY 351, 354 (David G. Stork ed., 1997).
80. Id.
81. Hage, supra note 66, at 255.
82. Thomas Hellström, On the Moral Responsibility of Military Robots, 15 ETHICS & INFO.
TECH. 99, 105 (2012).
83. Id.
84. Peter Asaro, A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on Robotics,
in ROBOT ETHICS THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 169 (Patrick Lin, Keith
Abney & George A. Bekey eds., 2012).
85. John P. Sullins, When is a Robot a Moral Agent?, 6 INT’L REV. INFO. ETHICS 23 (2006)
(arguing that in cases where a robot, or other intelligent artifact, fulfills criteria to be a moral agent, it
also inherits moral rights as well as responsibilities).
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suffering.” 86 This particular view of moral agency presupposes that these
entities will have to be at least reactive to be held responsible. Others
argue that moral agents need to be capable of understanding the meaning
of the information that they process.87
Floridi and Sanders, in a move around this problem, propose to
extend “the class of moral agents” to include artificial agents,88
disconnecting moral agency from the notion of moral responsibility. That
is, artificial agents should be acknowledged as moral agents that can be
held accountable, but not responsible. 89 In this case, according to Floridi
and Sanders, we can deal directly with the artificial agent for its “bad
behavior,” for example modifying or deleting it. 90
A counterargument to Floridi’s and Sanders’s view is that this would
draw attention away from the humans that create, deploy, and use these
artificial agents. Johnson, for example, argues that these technologies,
although part of the moral world, remain connected to the particular
values of their creators and users, as “their functionality has been
intentionally created.” 91 However, this approach might not adequately
capture the type of “higher-order intentional systems” suggested by
Dennett. While it is true that traditional brain implants are designed,
developed, tested, implanted, initiated, and provided with input, not all
new brain implants are provided with particular instructions to perform
specified tasks; rather some machine learning-based brain implants are
given the “freedom” to find the solution that would lead to the desired
outcome. In a way, how different is that from us humans? What is true,
however, is that regardless of whether we consider or not brain implants
as moral agents, we should not disregard the “social, temporal, cultural,
economic or political factors” that shape the development and use of such
technologies. 92

86. E.g., Sparrow, supra note 74, at 72; See also Asaro, supra note 84.
87. Bernd Carsten Stahl, Information, Ethics, and Computers: The Problem of Autonomous
Moral Agents, 14 MINDS & MACHINES 67 (2004).
88. Luciano Floridi & J.W. Sanders, On the Morality of Artificial Agents, 14 MINDS AND
MACHINES 349, 361 (2004).
89. Id. Floridi and Sanders’s view is counter to generally accepted differences between
accountability and responsibility, in that being accountable is taken to mean not only being
responsible for an action but also ultimately being answerable for that action. But it addresses the
problem that while responsibility can be shared, accountability cannot.
90. Id.
91. Deborah G. Johnson, Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents, 8 ETHICS &
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 195, 201 (2006).
92. MEREL ELISABETH NOORMAN, MIND THE GAP: A CRITIQUE OF HUMAN/TECHNOLOGY
ANALOGIES IN ARTIFICIAL AGENTS DISCOURSE 6–7 (2009).
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Even those that do not see technologies as moral agents still see the
active role technology has in shaping human action as part of
understanding moral responsibility. 93 In this regard, Johnson argues for a
type of shared moral responsibility where the engineer, the brain implant,
and the user would all be part of the moral evaluation.94 Floridi has
explored a similar approach with his concept of “distributed moral
action,” 95 in which multi-agent systems (including humans along with
artificial and hybrid systems) can be held responsible for distributing
“morally loaded actions.” 96
Others, rather than focusing on discussing whether artificial agents
are moral agents, or whether they can be held responsible, have focused
on the role that technology design and development have in addressing
responsibility issues. 97 For example, according to Moor, artificial agents
can be “implicit ethical agents,” as they embody the ethics that their
developers inscribed in their design. 98 They can be “explicit ethical
agents,” representing ethics explicitly and operating on the basis of that
knowledge, or “full ethical agents” making ethical judgments that can be
justified, much as human beings can. 99 Moor, together with several others,
remains skeptical that brain implants, even closed-loop implants designed
with machine learning, will ever be full ethical agents. However, the
distinction he provides between implicit and explicit ethical agents is
helpful for those working on how to design technologies that can be more
ethical. Similarly, Johnson and Noorman argue that we should focus on
“how to develop artificial agents to ensure that humans can be responsible
for their behavior.” 100

93. See generally, HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY (Hans Jonas trans.,
1984) (1979); Verbeek, supra note 49.
94. Johnson, supra note 91, at 204.
95. Luciano Floridi, Distributed Morality in an Information Society, 19 SCI. & ENGINEERING
ETHICS 727 (2012).
96. Luciano Floridi, Faultless Responsibility: On the Nature and Allocation of Moral
Responsibility for Distributed Moral Actions, 374 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 2083, 2083
(2016). See also Floridi, supra note 40.
97. Deborah G. Johnson & Merel Noorman, Recommendations for Future Development of
Artificial Agents [Commentary], 33 IEEE TECH. & SOC’Y MAG. 22, 24 (2014).
98. James H. Moor, The Nature, Importance, and Difficulty of Machine Ethics, IEEE
INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, July/August 2006, at 18, 19.
99. Id. at 20.
100. Johnson and Noorman, supra note 97, at 22. One of the suggestions they put forward as a
way to ensure that humans remain responsible for the behavior of artificial agents is to think about
responsibility as a “set of practices,” that is, the “established ways (e.g, regulations, medical
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Regardless of whether we agree that brain implants can be moral
agents, have shared or distributed responsibility with humans, it is clear
that with the introduction of even more intelligent technologies,
traditional views on moral responsibility are not suitable to capture the
complexities of the relationship between responsibility and technology.
It is upon these theories of moral responsibility, agency, and
causation that legal liability rests.
IV. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Legal liability for actions that society frowns upon is generally
divided into two systems—public and private. Of those systems, we will
discuss various issues in criminal and tort liability as ways in which a
morally responsible actor could be held liable as a consequence of his
actions. 101
A.

Criminal Law

Law students are commonly taught that criminal liability is based on
the paired concepts of actus reus, a guilty act, and mens rea, a guilty
mind. 102 These common law concepts of actus reus and mens rea have
deep roots in Anglo-American law as these concepts look towards the
mind of the defendant to gauge whether he is guilty of a crime and to what
level he may be guilty. 103 The terms, if not the ideas behind them, are often
traced back as far as the 17th century to the English jurist Sir Edward
Coke, who penned the legal maxim “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit
rea” (an act does not make a person guilty unless his mind is also
guilty). 104 The United States Supreme Court supported this maxim in

guidelines, social norms) in which groups and individuals in a community understand, evaluate, and
distribute responsibility.” Id. at 26.
101. This distinction, of course, is a generalization which ignores causes of action and remedies
such as administrative penalties.
102. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 5.1 (3d. ed. 2019); see
also Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Actus Reus, Mens Rea and Brain Science: What Do
Volition and Intent Really Mean?, 106 KY. L.J. 265, 267 (2017); Melissa Hamilton, Reinvigorating
Actus Reus: The Case for Involuntary Actions by Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 340, 340 (2011); Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness
Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545, 1545 (2013).
103. For an in-depth history of intent in criminal law, see Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea
Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L.
REV. 635 (1993); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932).
104. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, *107.
See also, Eugene J. Chesney, Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, 29 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 627, 632 (1939); Hamilton, supra note 102, at 343; Gardner, supra note 103, at 636.
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Morissette v. United States, stating that crime is “a compound concept,
generally constituted only from the concurrence of an evil-meaning mind
with an evil-doing hand . . . .” 105
Criminal responsibility, therefore, generally requires a criminal act
(actus reus) and a concurrent criminal intent (mens rea).106 This
requirement of both act and intent remains a core of much of modern
criminal law today. Generally, both actus reus and mens rea must be met
in some connected way for a person to be criminally liable. Actus reus is
often thought of as the more external, factual, or objective element, and is
a voluntary act or omission that is in some way prohibited. 107 Mens rea is
generally considered the more internal, mental, or subjective element and
refers to the state of mind of the actor. 108
1. Actus Reus—A Voluntary Act
A prohibited act is generally considered a necessary element for
criminal culpability—otherwise simple thought could be a crime. 109
Indeed, the Model Penal Code specifically states that an individual “is not
guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a
voluntary act . . . .” 110 While the act might be thought as the more
straightforward of the two elements of mens rea and actus reus, it instead
has a history of inconsistency and confusion in scholarly literature and
judicial treatment. 111
But see Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1551 (commenting that the term actus reus may actually
be a product of the 20th century).
105. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
106. See Fowler v. Padget, 7 Term Rep. 509, 514 (1798) (“It is a principle of natural justice,
and of our law, that actus facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The intent and the Act must both concur to
constitute the crime.”); see also Gardner, supra note 103, at 636; Sayre, supra note 103, at 974.
However, some specific statutes, most notably those of possession of controlled substances, may not
have a true act requirement, and “strict liability” statutes require no mens rea. See, e.g., Douglas
Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2439–45 (2007); Toke, infra
note 151 and associated text.
107. Francesca Lagioia & Giovanni Sartor, AI Systems Under Criminal Law: A Legal Analysis
and a Regulatory Perspective, 33 PHIL. & TECH. 433, 439–40 (2019); Beecher-Monas, supra note
102, at 267; LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 5.1; Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1549–50.
Generally, an omission to act would only meet the requirements for actus reus if there existed a duty
for the defendant to act in some way.
108. See Gardner, supra note 103, at 637; LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 5.1.
109. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Conciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 269, 282–84 (2002); Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1552–54; LAFAVE, supra note
102, § 6.1(b). But see Husak, supra note 106, at 2439–45; Michael Corrado, Is there an Act
Requirement in the Criminal Law?, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1994).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
111. See, e.g., Kevin W. Saunders, Voluntary Acts and Criminal Law: Justifying Culpability
Based on the Existence of Volition, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 443, 449 (1988) (“General consensus is
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This inconsistency in definition and concept is compounded by the
idea that an act must be a voluntary one; after all, it would serve little
purpose, either as retribution or deterrence, to punish a person for an act
that was not done voluntarily. 112 By requiring a voluntary action before
criminal liability can attach, actus reus plays a dual role, preventing the
punishment of either “thought crimes” or actions fully outside the control
of the defendant. 113 Layering the potential for brain implants to inhibit
voluntary actions or incite involuntary actions into the confusion of actus
reus may make this element of criminal liability the most difficult for the
law to apply.
Although it is generally considered a core concept in criminal law,
there is little consensus on what “voluntary act” means. Even the
seemingly simple term “act” has divergent treatments in the literature. 114
Sir John William Salmond broadly defined an act as incorporating a
bodily movement or action as well as the circumstances surrounding that
action and the consequences of that action.115 In contrast, Oliver Wendell
Holmes considered mere body movement, without reference to any
surrounding circumstances or consequences, to be an act. 116 Holmes
wrote, “An act is always a voluntary muscular contraction, and nothing
else.” 117 This definition, of course, brings in the problematic term
“voluntary.”
Defining volition, or the voluntary nature of an act, has been even
more contentious than defining an act. Volition has been variously
described as a physical manifestation of a defendant’s will and
determination, behavior that is under the control of the defendant, or

lacking regarding what constitutes an act.”); Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1551 (“Although
the voluntary act requirement is routinely referred to as an equally ‘fundamental principle’ of criminal
law, there is remarkably little consensus about what it means, why it is required, and how it relates to
other elements of criminal liability, including mens rea.”); Hamilton, supra note 102, at 344–52
(describing various approaches to actus reus in the literature and case law).
112. LaFave, supra note 102, § 6.1(c).
113. Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1554.
114. See id. at 1548–55; Hamilton, supra note 102, at 344–48; Saunders, supra note 111, at
449–53; LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 6.1.
115. JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 370 (10th ed. 1947). For an in-depth
discussion of Salmond’s concept of an act, see Saunders, supra note 111, at 450–53.
116. Corrado, supra note 109, at 1529 n.1. Corrado’s article contains an extensive discussion of
voluntariness and movement as an act. Id. See also LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 6.1(a).
117. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 91 (1881). Like Holmes’s definition,
the Model Penal Code defines an act by bodily movement: “‘act’ or ‘action’ means a bodily movement
whether voluntary or involuntary.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (AM. LAW INST 1962). The Model
Penal Code then requires that an act be voluntary for criminal liability to be imposed. Id. § 2.01(1).
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simply been identified by what it is not.118 The Model Penal Code uses
this last method. Rather than defining a voluntary act, the Model Penal
Code specifically excludes “(a) a reflex or convulsion; (b) a bodily
movement during unconsciousness or sleep; (c) conduct during hypnosis
or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; (d) a bodily movement that
otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either
conscious or habitual.” 119
The importance of the Model Penal Code’s incorporation of a
voluntary act as an element of a crime, and thus the actus reus concept,
cannot be overstated. The majority of U.S. states have incorporated the
Model Penal Code (in whole or part) into their statutes. 120 Furthermore,
most crimes today are statutory, rather than common law. 121
Michigan, for instance, states in its Revised Statutes that an
individual’s “criminal liability is based on conduct that includes either a
voluntary act or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is
capable of performing.” 122 While Michigan does not seem to have
supplied a statutory definition for a voluntary act, the statute clearly
considers a voluntary act or omission as an element required for a
defendant to be guilty of a crime.
Given the debates surrounding actus reus in the literature and the
confusion over whether the ‘objective’ element has a mental component,
it should come as no surprise that judicial treatment of actus reus is also
inconsistent. 123 These debates are not inconsequential. The interpretation
of the voluntariness of an act could impact liability for crimes that have a
strict liability mens rea. 124 Similarly, voluntariness as an element of a
crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but lack of
voluntariness as a defense moves the burden onto the defendant. 125
Criminal liability for DBS patients further complicates this picture.
Assuming from the ethical discussion above that we grant moral agency
118. See LAFAVE, supra note 102, § 6.1(c); Hamilton, supra note 102, at 344–48; Corrado,
supra note 109; Husak, supra note 106. For an in-depth discussion of the voluntariness aspect of an
act in criminal law, see Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102.
119. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
120. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007).
121. Id. at 320.
122. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 8.9(1)(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
123. For extensive discussions of the judicial application of the voluntariness requirement to
actus reus, see Denno, supra note 109, at 275–86; Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 102, at
293–96; Hamilton, supra note 102, at 348–52; Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1555–67.
124. Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1547.
125. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 102, at 293–94; Hamilton, supra note 102, at
349–51; Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1556–64.
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to the brain implant, is the action a voluntary activity of the patient or the
brain implant itself? Even if the brain implant has no moral agency, is the
voluntary act of getting an implant that influences actions enough to
overcome the volition requirement for an unrelated criminal action? Or
should the effects of the brain implant be considered along the same lines
as a muscle spasm or convulsion? Due to the differences in the application
of the voluntariness standard in mens rea, it is impossible to predict how
courts will analyze the situation. Additionally, the need for proof as to the
impact of the brain implant on volition will turn on the role of
voluntariness as an element of the crime or as a defense. Finally, the
specific technology at issue, such as the use of the brain implant and the
potential use of an AI in conjunction with the brain implant, may also
impact the voluntariness analysis.
Despite descriptions of actus reus as comprising the external or
objective element of a crime, the inclusion of volition in the act element
clearly adds an internal or mental aspect. This has led some commentators
and courts to incorrectly conflate the subjective analysis of voluntariness
with that of intent in the mens rea element of the crime. 126 It is possible
that meeting the intent requirement of mens rea would also meet the
voluntariness requirement of actus reus, but the reverse may not be true.
For example, a willful, voluntary movement of a leg does not necessarily
imply that the actor intended to trip a passerby. Therefore, we will
examine mens rea separately.
2. Mens Rea
Mens rea is the state of mind for the voluntary act. Despite its
importance in the area of criminal law, mens rea has long been a source
of confusion and argument. 127 Various courts and statutes have attempted
to describe requisite mens rea with terms such as intentionally, knowingly,
willfully, malice aforethought, and so on. 128 Further confusion is supplied
by the common law categories of general intent and specific intent.
126. See Farrell & Marceau, supra note 102, at 1564–65; Hamilton, supra note 102, at 351.
127. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. at 252 (“The unanimity with which they
have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized
by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental
element.”); see also Sayre, supra note 103, at 974 (“[W]hen it comes to attaching a precise meaning
to mens rea, courts and writers are in hopeless disagreement.”).
128. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 (“However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the
purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the
instruction of juries around such terms as ‘felonious intent,’ ‘criminal intent,’ ‘malice aforethought,’
‘guilty knowledge,’ ‘fraudulent intent,’ ‘wilfulness,’ ‘scienter,’ to denote guilty knowledge, or ‘mens
rea,’ to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

28

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[54:1

General intent is the intent to commit the act in question. 129 Therefore, a
crime requiring only general intent does not require that the defendant
have any desire to violate the law or have any awareness that the act would
produce some specific harm. Crimes of specific intent, on the other hand,
require the intent to both commit the act and produce a particular result
thereby. 130
Statutes are often unclear as to whether they require simply general
or specific intent. In such cases, it is left to the courts to determine whether
the legislature desired general or specific intent. The definition of firstdegree murder, for instance, may require that an act was committed with
the specific intent that it results in the death of another. 131 In contrast,
second-degree manslaughter would simply require that the act was
intended, rather than the result being intended, and thus is a general intent
crime. 132
The Model Penal Code attempted to alleviate the confusion
surrounding mens rea 133 by presenting four levels of responsibility, or
“descriptive states of mind,” 134 for crimes requiring mens rea. 135 These
levels, listed from the least to the most serious, are: negligently,
recklessly, knowingly, and purposely. 136
Of these, knowingly and purposely are most aligned with the
common law concept of intent. The Model Penal Code defines a person
as acting purposely “(i) if the element [of an offense] involves the nature
of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element
involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
129. See Eric A. Johnson, Understanding General and Specific Intent: Eight Things I Know for
Sure, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 530 (2016).
130. Id. at 525.
131. For example, the New York statute for first degree murder states, in pertinent part: “A
person is guilty of murder in the first degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause the death of another
person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person. . .” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(1)
(McKinney 2019). The state of Virginia defines first degree murder in pertinent part as “[m]urder,
other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape,
forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction . . . .”
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2020).
132. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 2019) (“A person is guilty of
manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e recklessly causes the death of another person . . . .”)
133. Gardner, supra note 103, at 682.
134. See id. at 688–90.
135. The category of strict liability crimes have no requisite mental component but would still,
theoretically, require a voluntary actus reus. R.A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law,
12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 733 n. 15 (1960).
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
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circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” 137 In contrast, the
Model Penal Code defines a person’s actions as knowingly “(i) if the
element [of an offense] involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct,
he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result.” 138
Therefore, “purposely” requires that it was the “conscious object,”
or the specific intent, of the person to engage in the criminal act or produce
a particular result. 139 “Knowingly,” however, is satisfied if the person is
aware a particular result is almost certain to occur due to the act taken. 140
Despite the Model Penal Code’s attempt to offer a clarified structure
for mens rea analysis, the mental component of criminal law remains a
murky and confusing area. Recent technological advances in diverse
neurosciences have only produced more challenges for this analysis.
Some studies have found that neuroscience evidence has been generally
limited to the mitigation of punishment, diminished capacity, and
ineffective assistance of counsel. 141 However, while limited, these cases
exist across a large swath of criminal charges. 142
Brain implants introduce the potential of an external stimulus that
may alter the intent or produce actions entirely in the absence of a person’s
intent. For instance, brain implants have the potential to reduce the
capacity of a person to possess a requisite mental state. In particular, brain
implants may implicate the doctrine of diminished capacity. Diminished
capacity is based on the idea that a person cannot be guilty of a crime if
she is incapable of forming the necessary intent to be criminally liable.
Diminished capacity, accepted in many jurisdictions, allows the
defense to attack the prosecution’s evidence of a particular mental state.143
This evidence may consist of testimony by mental health clinicians to
demonstrate that the defendant had a mental disease that would preclude
her from forming the requisite mens rea. For example, Ms. Q, who
137. Id. § 2.02.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
140. Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
141. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law:
An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (2015); Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the
Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 493 (2015).
142. Henry T. Greely & Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and the Criminal Justice System, 2
ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 455 (2019).
143. Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and
Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 47 (2007).
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swerved her car into a crowded bus stop, killing several bystanders, might
be charged with second-degree murder 144 and manslaughter. 145 If the
defense can show evidence that she did not intentionally swerve the car in
order to kill people, but that she only intended to swerve, then she may be
convicted of manslaughter, but not second-degree murder. Therefore,
evidence of the effects of brain implants is particularly relevant in crimes
requiring specific intent. Some jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code
approach, allowing diminished capacity evidence in all crimes with a
requisite mental state. Other jurisdictions that use the doctrine of
diminished capacity restrict it to crimes requiring specific intent, or
sometimes even just murder. 146
Our various fictitious scenarios illustrate some of the problems that
brain implants may impart to the mens rea analysis. Mr. D’s use of DBS
would render him in such an incapacitated state that he would need
permanent psychiatric care. It is not a stretch to say that he would have
diminished capacity while using DBS. On the other hand, in our scenario
he chose to become incapacitated in order to treat a disease. To what
extent should he then bear the responsibility for acts that he commits in
such a state? Mr. B’s love of Johnny Cash and his corresponding debt is
due to DBS. But to what extent would his choice to commit theft be?
Without the influence of DBS, he might have chosen to sell his Johnny
Cash collection rather than steal. Conversely, even with DBS, he might
have had other options to legally deal with his debt—even if it meant
losing his house. The DBS would perhaps be influencing his choices but
would not be directly urging him to steal. But how would we practically
differentiate the two?
Similarly, the strength of the hypothetical Ms. Q’s urge to swerve
would be difficult to prove. The urge could be anywhere on the spectrum,
from uncontrollable muscle spasms to a desire to jerk the wheel and see
what happens. How should the difficulty in proving the impact of DBS
affect legal liability for the action?

144. “[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely or knowingly;
or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life.” MPC 210.2.
145. “Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or (b) a
homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.” MPC 210.3.
146. Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and
Criminal Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 47 (2007).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss1/1

30

Cabrera and Carter-Johnson: Emergent Neurotechnologies

2020]

B.

EMERGENT NEUROTECHNOLOGIES

31

Civil Liability

The private system of tort liability allows a person to seek
recompense from a second individual in court, even if there is no criminal
liability. Tort liability may allow multiple parties to be held responsible
for an action, depending on the theory put forth. For instance, in Ms. Q’s
car accident, an injured party might sue Ms. Q as well as the brain implant
manufacturer and the surgeon who installed it. While torts may be
characterized in many ways, for our purposes, we will divide torts into
those based on product liability, medical malpractice, and patient liability.
1. Product Liability (Strict Liability)
One theory under which product manufacturers have generally been
held liable for harms caused by their products is product liability. Product
liability is a strict liability tort in which no intent is necessary, thus muting
much of our discussion of agency and moral responsibility. 147 However,
even here, the peculiarities of DBS and its software-driven (and
potentially AI-driven) effects complicate the analysis of liability.
Additionally, the ability to sue medical device manufacturers under
a products liability cause of action has been sharply abrogated under
statutes and recent case law. Before looking at potential pre-emption
issues, a look at general product liability law and FDA regulatory
procedures for medical devices is necessary.
Products liability theory imposes strict liability on a product
manufacturer if the product sold has defects in its design or manufacture,
or in the product warnings. 148 While manufacture defects often involve a
straightforward analysis of the product to the manufacturer’s own designs,
design defects are more difficult to determine. Defective designs can be
proven under either a consumer expectations test or a cost-benefit
approach. Under the consumer expectations test, “[t]he article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge to
the community as to its characteristics.” 149 The cost-benefit approach is
used “when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have
been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative
design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the product

147.
148.
149.
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not reasonably safe . . . .” 150 These tests require the court to determine the
standard of proper design. 151
Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that
plaintiffs hurt by defective products include consumers, users, and
bystanders. 152 Therefore, product liability causes of action generally are
open to both DBS patients and those harmed by the patients’ actions.
However, recent interpretations of the statutes surrounding medical
device regulation have abrogated product liability causes of action.
In Riegel v. Medtronic, 153 the Supreme Court held that the
preemption clause of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) 154
bars state claims challenging safety or effectiveness of a medical device
that has been approved by the FDA. Manufacturing defects in which the
product does not comply with the designs submitted to the FDA are not
covered by this preemption. But the Riegel decision limits product
liability for design and warning defects for devices that require FDA premarket approval. Not all medical devices require pre-market approval.
Medical devices are broadly defined as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article . . . which is . . . intended
for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other
animals. 155

Under this broad definition, medical devices are subdivided into three
classes based on risk assessments of the intended use of the product. 156
Each medical device class has its own regulatory requirements, 157
which in turn impacts the product liability under which manufacturers
operate. Class I devices do not introduce substantial safety risks to
patients. Class II and class III pose safety risks to patients with increasing
severity in each classification. Class I and class II devices do not require
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
151. Michael J. Toke, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Design Defectiveness in American
Products Liability Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 241 (1996).
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A caveat 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
153. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
154. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2018).
155. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012).
156. Device Classification Panels, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Aug.
31,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevic
e/ucm051530.htm [https://perma.cc/U4KM-QU53].
157. For an overview of the medical device review process, see Ashwani Sastry, Overview of
the US FDA Medical Device Approval Process, 16 CURRENT CARDIOLOGY REP. 494 (2014).
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pre-market approval, but rather a pre-market notification (often called a
501k notification after the authorizing statute). Class III devices require
submission of clinical trial data 158 and must obtain pre-market approval
(PMA) from the FDA before sales. 159 Therefore, under the holding of
Riegel v. Medtronic, only class III medical devices are generally exempt
from product liability claims based on the safety or effectiveness of the
device.
Due to its implantation into, and effects on, the brain, DBS is
accomplished using class III, FDA-approved medical devices. 160
Therefore, while product liability claims will continue to be available for
manufacturing defects of DBS devices, it is unlikely that products liability
will extend to problems arising from the initial design. However, there are
two theories under which DBS devices may still be subject to product
liability causes of action.
First, while the brain implanted portion of the DBS device is likely a
class III medical device, the FDA may not review the software portion of
the product at the same level.161 The application of product liability preemption in such cases has been called into question. 162 In Shuker v. Smith
& Nephew, the Third Circuit opened the door to analyzing each
component of a medical device separately for preemption purposes.163
Since the algorithms of the software are often a “black box” for the FDA
regulators, 164 it is possible that product liability claims for failure of AI
systems could be divorced from the pre-market approval preemption
under Riegel.
Second, DBS devices may evolve over time within the implanted
device itself. For instance, the cyber security of a device may be updated
regularly, and an AI that learns from prior rounds of stimulation and
response may reprogram itself to make different decisions in the future.
While the initial software will have been approved by the FDA, should
158. Id. at 496.
159. 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1)–(3).
160. Class III medical devices “sustain or support life, are implanted, or present potential
unreasonable risk of illness or injury. [Other] [e]xamples of Class III devices include implantable
pacemakers and breast implants.” Learn if a Medical Device Has Been Cleared by FDA for
Marketing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/consumers-medical-devices/learn-if-medical-device-has-been-cleared-fda-marketing
[https://perma.cc/RBN3-25N5].
161. See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 452
(2017).
162. Charlotte Tschider, Preempting the Artificially Intelligent Machine, BYU L.R.
(forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443987 [https://perma.cc/TVK8-D3TA].
163. Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770–74 (3d Cir. 2018).
164. See W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419 (2015).
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the pre-emption that follows from that approval extend to changes made
as the AI evolves? Additionally, as the AI evolves, it becomes less
tangibly linked to the device developer in the first instance. Returning to
the discussion of moral responsibility, can an AI be held liable separate
from its programmer? What would such liability look like—an AI does
not have its own bank account. If an AI is liable in some moral fashion,
does that separate liability shield the programmer from liability for
creating the AI that caused harm? The arguments of Nagenborg and
colleagues 165 would suggest professional responsibility should continue
to impart liability to the engineers designing and programing brain
implants, even if they cannot control them.
Finally, another potential exception to the design defect may occur
in the scenario of cyber hacking. Cybersecurity of medical devices is
constantly evolving to address new cyber threats. While the initial
cybersecurity is part of the FDA requirements when needed, and the FDA
encourages frequent updating of cybersecurity, those updates do not need
to be approved by the FDA before implementation. 166 Therefore, a DBS
device manufacturer may not be preempted by the MDA bar against tort
actions under Riegel.
One way to avoid the problem of the lack of liability for harm caused
by the DBS device regulation in the absence of strict liability for AI might
be to regulate the DBS AI as a medical provider.167 Many medical devices
already act more as diagnosticians than mere devices. 168 Such an option
leads to an analysis of the second group of torts based on negligence.
2. Professional Negligence
State-imposed duties of care generally define when negligence
liability lies. Negligence arises when a duty of care is breached and that
breach causes an injury. As an example of negligence, a breach of the
doctor-patient duty of care could give rise to an action for malpractice,
aka, professional negligence. There are two potential avenues to pursue

165. Michael Nagenborg, Rafeal Capurro, Jutta Weber & Christoph Pingel, Ethical Regulations
on Robotics in Europe, 22 AI & SOC’Y. 349 (2007).
166. The FDA’s Role in Medical Device Cybersecurity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/UCM544684.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VEU-4MTL]
167. See Jane R. Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (2017).
168. See Adam Candeub, Digital Medicine, the FDA, and the First Amendment, 49 GA. L. REV.
933 (2015) (discussing phone apps such as Dr. Mole, an app that tells customers if their moles are
likely to be benign or cancerous).
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medical malpractice claims in the DBS context—against the surgeon and
against the AI itself.
Medical malpractice requires four elements: fiduciary duty, breach
of the duty, causation, and damages. 169 Within a doctor-patient
relationship, doctors are held to a standard of care based upon their
fiduciary relationship with the patient. 170 The standard is based on the
reasonable care a doctor would give 171—often based on the standard of
care set forth by medical professional societies. 172
As doctors begin to use DBS or other techniques that increasingly
rely on AI or that have previously unknown side effects, the learning curve
for the new medical device may make the implementation of the device
risky enough to open the surgeon to liability. 173 Allowing an AI to make
dosing decisions using feedback algorithms may be helpful to the patient,
but could impact the level of care the doctor is perceived to be giving
unless there is continued oversight similar to that given to other agents.
Alternatively, Jane Bambauer has proposed regulating AI devices as
medical professionals subject to tort liability. 174 Such a proposal would be
interesting. Regulating an AI program as a medical professional would
treat the AI as a principal rather than an agent of the medical doctor. 175 In
such a case, the AI’s liability would likely be imputed to the medical
device manufacturer, and companies that produce DBS controlled by AI
would likely seek coverage for malpractice insurance similar to medical
professionals today.
3. Patient Tort Liability
In civil liability, we return to the liability of the brain implant patient
as we examine negligence and intentional tort liability of the patient.
Returning to the hypothetical of Ms. Q, who swerved into the bus shelter,
we can begin to see the complexity of her potential tort liability.

169. 3 BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 24:1 (2d ed.
2020).
170. Id. § 24:1, 24:3.
171. Id. § 24:15.
172. Id. § 24:35.
173. See Frank Griffin, The Trouble with the Curve: Manufacturer and Surgeon Liability for
“Learning Curves” Associated with Unreliably-Screened Implantable Medical Devices, 69 ARK. L.
REV. 755, 765 (2016).
174. Bambauer, supra note 167.
175. Hannah R. Sullivan & Scott J. Schweikart, Are Current Tort Liability Doctrines Adequate
for Addressing Injury Caused by AI?, 21 A.M.A J. ETHICS 160, 163–65 (2019).
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Intentional torts are based on actions that cause reasonably
foreseeable harm to an individual. 176 Intentional torts generally include
assault, 177 theft (conversion), 178 and fraud. 179 As with criminal law,
confusion exists as to how to interpret the intent requirement of these
torts. 180 Since intentional torts require an intentional action, the impact of
brain implants on the state of mind of the actor should matter as much as
described in criminal liability. For instance, debate exists as to whether
intent encompasses merely the intent to act (single intent) or intent to
perform an action and cause a harm (dual intent). 181
Although scholars conceded that the debate between single and dual
intent currently has few real-world consequences, 182 it could be important
in the DBS context. Ms. Q’s urge to swerve the car poses an interesting
question about intent. It is unclear whether her response was an intentional
response to an urge from an outside stimulus or an autonomic muscle
response. But even if it were an intentional action, in no case did Ms. Q
intend to swerve into a crowd of people. If it is the intent to produce the
action that legally matters for intentional torts, she could face liability.
Conversely, a dual intent standard would take into account the lack of
intent to harm others based on the improper operation of the brain implant.
While negligence does not depend on a state of mind, it does depend
on a number of factors that may be impacted by brain implants. Each
jurisdiction defines negligence slightly differently, but generally,
negligence requires (1) breach of a duty, (2) proximate cause, and (3)
damages. 183 Vehicle accidents are often brought as negligence actions.
The duty owed to society by a patient with a brain implant is
currently amorphous. Duties arise in society from social custom based on
the balance of societal safety against personal freedom. 184 Even if Ms. Q’s
urge to swerve the car was not intentional, driving while under the

176. “The word “intent” is used throughout the RESTATEMENT of this Subject to denote that
the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
177. See id. § 21.
178. See id. § 222A.
179. See id. § 525.
180. For a fuller discussion of the controversy as to intent in tort law, see Nancy J. Moore, Intent
and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U.L. REV. 1585 (2012).
181. Id. at 1588.
182. E.g., id. at 1593.
183. David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1672–74
(2007).
184. See id. at 1674–75.
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influence of a brain implant could be deemed a breach of a duty of safety
by the patient in a similar manner to patients with epileptic seizures. 185
Perhaps even the medical device company or the software
programmers could be reached through this negligence action. Generally,
the superseding cause doctrine, which says that “[w]hen a force of nature
or an independent act is also a factual cause of harm, an actor’s liability is
limited to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s
conduct tortious,” 186 would shield them from liability due to the
intervening negligent conduct of Ms. Q. However, the superseding cause
doctrine could be less helpful to AI developers as courts move to a
foreseeability standard if courts believe DBS-related accidents are
foreseeable. 187
V. CONCLUSION
Researchers, clinicians, manufacturers, and regulatory bodies should
cooperate to minimize the challenges and risks posed to responsibility
frameworks by brain implants. Considering the impact brain implants can
have on our moral and legal notions of responsibility, we need to discuss
whether and when brain interventions should excuse people. New
technologies often require some modification or extension of existing
legal mechanisms, so understanding the issues of responsibility raised by
brain implants will become increasingly important. It is possible that soon
we will start hearing in courtrooms: “It’s not my fault. My brain implant
made me do it.” And so, the question becomes, who will sing the Folsom
Prison Blues 188 in this new era of brain implants?

185. For an example of how Ohio treats negligence actions in the context of epilepsy, see
Kathryn Kramer, Shifting and Seizing: A Call to Reform Ohio’s Outdated Restrictions on Drivers
with Epilepsy, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 343, 357–58 (2009).
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 (AM. LAW INST.
2010).
187. See Weston Kowert, The Foreseeability Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions, 96
TEX. L. REV. 181, 189–91 (2017).
188. Johnny Cash, Folsom Prison Blues, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=6ZPToXstS8M [https://perma.cc/XKT9-27DN].
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